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Abstract
Agent-based computational economics (ACE) has been used for tackling major research ques-
tions in macroeconomics for at least two decades. This growing field positions itself as an
alternative to dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models. In this paper we first
review the arguments raised against DSGE in the ACE literature. We then review existing
ACE models, and their empirical performance. We then turn to a literature on behavioural
New Keynesian models that attempts to synthesise these two approaches to macroeconomic
modelling by incorporating some of the insights of ACE into DSGE modelling. We highlight
the individually rational New Keynesian model following Deak et al. (2015) and discuss how
this line of research can progress.
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1 Introduction
Agent based (AB) modelling is a computational research method that is frequently used in studies
of complex social phenomena. As the name suggests, simple representations of decision-makers in
social, economic, or political contexts are at the core of this method. By generating a high number
of heterogeneous agents that can respond to individual and local as well as aggregate variables,
researchers can simulate adaptive behaviour, interdependent decision making, spatial patterns and
social networks in a broad range of contexts. The AB literature in economics has been given a
number of names, but it is most commonly referred to as agent-based computational economics
(ACE).
The present paper reviews both the macroeconomic ACE literature and the literature that
attempts to incorporate some of the insights of ACE into DSGE modelling. The purpose of the
present study is therefore synthesis - we review and justify a literature that has responded to dis-
satisfaction with conventional DSGE modelling over the past 5-10 years. As well as presenting and
placing very recent research within this literature, we discuss how the program as a whole can de-
velop. We begin with a brief overview of some relevant criticisms of DSGE modelling from the ACE
perspective, followed by an examination of some key models in the macroeconomic ACE literature
and their empirical performance. We then discuss the extent to which the limitations highlighted
in ACE studies have been addressed in recent DSGE models, particularly the behavioural New
Keynesian model. Finally, we present very recent work following Deak et al. (2015) on the in-
dividually rational New Keynesian model, which provides the behavioural New Keynesian model
with more robust microfoundations. We hope that this will provide a framework for future work
towards a more realistic macroeconomics.
The paper is organised in five sections. Section 2 reviews the criticisms that the macro ACE
literature directs towards DSGE models. Section 3 provides an overview of the macro ACE lit-
erature, and some key models. Section 4 reviews the empirical performance of these key models.
Section 5 considers how the insights of the macro ACE literature can be incorporated into the
DSGE framework, and discusses the behavioural and individually rational New Keynesian models.
Finally, section 6 concludes.
2 ACE Critiques of DSGE
In this section we review some of the criticisms of DSGE modelling from an ACE perspective. We do
not present a comprehensive review of the criticisms directed at DSGE from ACE scholars. Rather,
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we present those criticisms that seem most important in achieving a constructive re-evaluation of
the DSGE and ACE approaches. Specifically, we consider three arguments: that DSGE models
ignore heterogeneity amongst agents, complex dynamics, and bounded rationality.
2.1 Representative Agents versus Heterogeneous Interacting Agents
The representative agent (RA) assumption is the idea that a single agent can stand for an entire
sector of the economy. This is, arguably, at the centre of both DSGE analysis and criticism towards
it. Alongside a number of epistemological concerns (see Delli Gatti et al. (2005), Delli Gatti et al.
(2010)), ACE critics argue that the RA assumption ignores heterogeneity, non-normal distributions,
interactions between agents, and is incompatible with observations of scaling effects (Delli Gatti
et al. (2005)). By ignoring interactions and interdependencies between agents, RA overlooks the
occurrence of large aggregate fluctuations as a consequence of small idiosyncratic shocks and does
not allow any room for emergent macroscopic patterns (Delli Gatti et al. (2005), Gaffeo et al.
(2007), see also Gabaix (2011) in this respect). Finally, the RA assumption is also criticised in
terms of the purpose it serves. In situations where preferences are influenced by policy regimes
(Bowles (1998), Delli Gatti et al. (2010)), the RA approach might not be able to deliver policy-
independent microfoundations.
2.2 Complexity and Endogenous Cycles
In light of the arguments that DSGE modelling ignores heterogeneity and local interaction by
specifying representative agents, ACE scholars criticise mainstream macroeconomics for ignoring
the fundamental complexity of economic dynamics. Whilst complexity is often only approximately
defined, the basic determinants are a high dimensional state space and a degree of non-linearity
such that superposition is not present. Superposition is a property of linear systems, whereby the
net response of a system to two or more simultaneous impulses is given by the sum of the responses
of the system to the same impulses separately. In particular, two identical impulses, differing only
in sign, will cancel each other out. With non-linear models this property fails to hold, and as such
the response of a non-linear system to an impulse is not necessarily proportional to the size of the
shock, and the state of the system will matter in determining the response to any given shock.
Thus small shocks can give rise to large business cycles, and phenomena such as financial fragility
can be studied.
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The macro ACE community argue that this type of complexity is pervasive in macroeconomics,
with particular importance being given to endogenous business cycles, or business cycles that
are not driven by aggregate shocks. Dosi et al. (2008), for example, argue that real business
cycle models and New Keynesian DSGE models are both inadequate because a large part of the
dynamics are driven by aggregate technology shocks, and “both streams of literature dramatically
underestimate the role of endogenous technological shocks occurring at the microeconomic level”
(ibid.). Gaffeo et al. (2007), similarly, argue that “complexity arises because of the dispersed,
localized, non-linear interactions of a large number of heterogeneous components”, and that the
economy should be modelled as such.1
2.3 Rational Expectations versus Bounded Rationality
The final ACE criticism of the DSGE paradigm that we wish to highlight is concerned with rational
expectations. This criticism is similar to existing critiques of the rational expectations hypothesis,
which extend back to the early days of New Classical economic theory, but arises as an almost
necessary conclusion from the focus on heterogeneity and complexity. An interesting extension of
the rational expectations critique from the ACE community is linked to the concept of “emergence”
- since real-life versions of economic agents are clearly not equipped with perfect information and
foresight, rational expectations are not a property of individual agents but of the system as a
whole. In other words, rational expectations supposes that expectations are correct on average,
and economic theory refers to an instance of “emergence” in the RE hypothesis. This, of course,
is contested. For example, Howitt argues that, “even blind faith in individual rationality does not
guarantee that the system as a whole will find this fixed point [of rational expectations]” (Howitt
(2012)).
2.4 Summary
Given the above, ACE models move away from DSGE models along the lines of heterogeneity,
complexity, and rationality. It is worth noting at the outset that a number of dynamic general
equilibrium models have already addressed these issues, to a certain extent - the highly nonlinear
models of Branch and McGough (2010), or the internal rationality models of Eusepi and Preston
(2011), for example and there is a large and growing DSGE literature with heterogeneous agent
1It should be noted that endogenous business cycles have a history that long pre-dates ACE - Hicks, Kalecki, and
Kaldor were early advocates, and Goodwin (1967) is a classic example. This literature continues in contemporary
Post Keynesian and Marxian economics.
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models in the spirit of Krusell and Smith (1998). Before these can be considered in greater detail
in section 5, some key macroeconomic ACE models are examined in section 3, and their empirical
performance is reviewed in section 4.
3 Key Macro ACE Models
Although it is often difficult to classify and compare ACE models, it is possible to identify three
major families of models within the macro ACE literature. These are the Keynes meets Schumpeter
(K&S) model (Dosi et al. (2006), Dosi et al. (2008), Dosi et al. (2010), Dosi et al. (2013)), the
CATS model2 (Delli Gatti et al. (2005), Delli Gatti et al. (2007), Delli Gatti et al. (2010), Gaffeo
et al. (2007), Russo et al. (2007), Ricetti et al. (2013)), and the Eurace model (Deissenberg et al.
(2008), Dawid et al. (2009), Cincotti et al. (2010), Dawid and Neugart (2011), Raberto et al.
(2011)). The following subsections briefly examine each of these model families in turn, focusing
on the areas of disagreement with DSGE described above: agent heterogeneity, complexity, and
rationality.
3.1 The K&S Model
The K&S model was first developed in Dosi et al. (2006) and Dosi et al. (2008) for exploring industry
dynamics and for simulating endogenous business cycles with Keynesian features. Later versions of
the model emphasise the synthesis that the model creates between Keynesian approaches to demand
dynamics and Schumpeterian approaches to innovation, and add Minskyan credit dynamics to the
analysis (Dosi et al. (2010), Dosi et al. (2013)). Given this, early versions of the model incorporated
a great deal of agent heterogeneity, with relatively little direct interaction. In Dosi et al. (2006)
and Dosi et al. (2008), firms are divided into consumption and capital goods firms, with the latter
producing heterogeneous capital goods driven by idiosyncratic shocks to firm level technology. In
Dosi et al. (2008), all direct interaction takes place between consumption and capital goods firms,
with all other interaction at an aggregate level - the real wage, for example, evolves according to
an aggregate wage equation.
Agent behaviour in this context is boundedly rational. Whilst households consume all of their
income (an extreme form of the Keynesian consumption heuristic), firms price and produce in an
approximately Post Keynesian manner. For example, production levels are determined by naive
2Also referred to as the MBU model in Delli Gatti et al. (2011). MBU stands for “Macroeconomics from the
Bottom Up”, whereas CATS stands for “Complex AdapTive System” (ibid.).
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or adaptive expectations over demand levels, and pricing is given by a mark-up over unit costs,
where the mark-up evolves according to the following heuristic:
µjt = µjt−1
(
1 +
fjt−1 − fjt−2
fjt−2
)
. (1)
In (1), µj denotes firm j’s mark-up, whilst fj denotes firm j’s market share. Whilst this heuristic
could be interpreted as pursuing profit maximisation, there is no attempt in the Dosi et al papers
to formally justify this. Given the above, the K&S model produces macroeconomic complexity in
the sense of endogenous business cycles, which appear to be driven by pervasive non-linearity and
idiosyncratic shocks.
3.2 The CATS Model
Like the K&S model, the CATS model was initially built for studying business cycles, and incor-
porates heterogeneity and bounded rationality, but the structures of the two families of models
are quite different. In general, the CATS models are simpler than the K&S models in terms of
agent types, and more complex in terms of direct interaction. For example, the Russo et al. (2007)
model is a one sector model, with idiosyncratic R&D shocks at the firm level. Again, firms’ pricing
strategies are boundedly rational, and evolve according to the following heuristic:
P sjt =

 Pjt−1(1 + ηjt) if Sjt−1 = 0Pjt−1(1− ηjt) if Sjt−1 > 0 (2)
In (2), Sj denotes the firm’s stock of unsold goods, and ηj is a firm specific idiosyncratic shock.
Hence the firm raises its price if it sells all its produced output in the previous period, and lowers
it otherwise. This is not associated with profit maximisation, but is associated with Simon’s
“satisficing” approach to firm behaviour (P sj denotes the firm’s “satisfying” price; this is equal
to the selling price if it covers unit cost). As with the K&S models, the CATS models produce
macroeconomic complexity in the sense of endogenous business cycles driven by idiosyncratic shocks
and pervasive non-linearity.
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3.3 The Eurace Model
The Eurace model was produced in an attempt to construct an agent-based model of the European
economy. The aim is to simulate interactions of a very large number of heterogenous agents within
a complex environment that represents NUTS-2 regions of the EU-27 countries (Deissenberg et al.
(2008)). As with the K&S and CATS model, the Eurace model successfully produces endogenous
business cycles driven by non-linearity at the microeconomic level. In this larger model the heuristic
behaviour of at least some of the agents is brought closer to individual rationality - that is, explicit
utility and/or profit maximisation in the context of bounded rationality. In particular, the pricing
decision of consumption goods firms is predicated on the belief in a CES demand function. Denoting
the expected price elasticity as εe, firms set prices in the Eurace model as follows:
pjt =
c¯jt−1
1 + 1/εejt
(3)
In (3), c¯jt−1 is a measure of unit costs that takes into account past costs and inventory levels.
Household behaviour is also based on individual rationality, where the decision rule is justified by
appeal to prospect theory, and in particular the theory of loss aversion.
3.4 Summary
The overview of some of the key elements of the K&S, CATS, and Eurace models provided above
can only scratch the surface of what are vibrant and continuing research programs. Later versions
of the K&S and CATS models, for example, incorporate credit and banking networks, and examine
the role of government policy in controlling fluctuations and growth. Nevertheless, we hope to have
given an indication of the manner in which existing macro ACE models incorporate heterogeneity,
complexity, and bounded rationality.
4 Empirical Performance of Macro ACE Models
This section reviews the empirical performance of the models examined in section 3. As above, we
consider the three most prominent families of macro ACE models sequentially: the Dosi et al K&S
model, the Delli Gatti et al CATS model, and the Eurace model. In addition, we examine two
more recent models: the Lengnick (2013) model, and the Assenza et al. (2015) model. First, we
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provide a brief overview of the empirical method behind existing ACE studies, and examine the
empirical performance of the existing models in sections 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5. Finally, we briefly
consider the prospects for future empirical work in section 4.6.
4.1 Estimation in ACE
For the purpose of estimation, one can write the general form of an agent based model as follows:
Xt = F (Xt−1, ǫt−1, θ) (4)
Here, X is the matrix of individual states, ǫ is the vector of exogenous shocks, and θ is a vector
of parameters. Assuming that we can derive a vector or matrix of observable variables Yt from
Xt, and that the former correspond to a set of observed variables Q, the question faced is how
to estimate θ such that the “distance” between Y and Q is minimised. Interpreting ǫ as a vector
of stochastic shocks with a known distribution, and therefore the output of the model described
by (4) as a joint probability distribution for X, and assuming that the model described by (4)
corresponds to the data generating process behind Q up to the unknown values of θ, is usually
referred to as the probability approach to economics. This can be traced back to Haavelmo (1944),
and allows formal statistical inference to be employed in the model estimation procedure.
Given the above, the estimation and validation procedures employed in the macroeconomic
ACE literature are predominantly informal, in a similar spirit to the approach taken by the early
real business cycle literature (see Dejong & Dave 2007, ch.6). The chief approach is the classic
calibration exercise, which involves the assignment of numerical values to model parameters based
on a priori belief, external information, or steady state requirements. A well known example is
the unique determination of the steady state real interest rate by the rate of time preference in
real business cycle models; if one observes an average annual real interest rate of 5% over time, for
example, a natural parameterisation for the rate of time preference is 5%.
Model calibration, as recorded in DeJong and Dave (2007), can be traced back to Kyldland and
Prescott (1982). In turn, Kydland and Prescott trace their approach to the econometric method
of Ragnar Frisch:
In this review (Frisch) discusses what he considers to be ‘econometric analysis of the
genuine kind’ . . . and gives four examples of such analysis. None of these examples
involve the estimation and statistical testing of some model. None involve an attempt
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to discover some true relationship. All use a model, which is an abstraction of a complex
reality, to address some clear-cut question. (Kydland and Prescott 1991a, in Dejong
and Dave ibid.: 123)
This approach, in which the choice of numerical values for model parameters is independent
of formal statistical considerations, is completely at odds with the Haavelmo (1944) approach
described above. Whether or not one agrees with this approach or not, the key observation is that
if one does in fact compare summary statistics of the model generated joint probability distribution
with the equivalent statistics observed in economic data, one is implicitly taking the probability
approach to economics. Whilst the calibration approach to parameter choice can certainly be seen
in the earlier published output of Dosi et al and Delli Gatti et al, later papers uniformly provide
second moment comparisons alongside the calibration exercise. In this regards, ACE is moving
beyond the simple calibration exercise approach to quantitative macroeconomics. In what follows,
we consider the validation and recorded performance of the models considered in section 3, as well
as the Lengnick (2013) model and the Assenza (2015) model.
4.2 The K&S Model
Out of the papers studying the K&S model, Dosi et al. (2008) provides the most in depth empirical
validation. Dosi et al. (2008) initially identifies a number of stylised facts to facilitate basic quali-
tative validation of the model. These include the standard US business cycle facts, the lumpiness
and finance dependent nature of individual firm investment expenditure, pronounced and persis-
tent productivity dispersion across firms, and the distinctive distributions of firm size and firm
growth rates. The basic calibration follows the antecedent models in Dosi et al. (2005) and Dosi
et al. (2006), but is otherwise unexplained. Nevertheless, the model reproduces the basic stylised
facts that the authors target, and this result appears to be robust to the exact parameterisation
used (see Dosi et al. (2006)).
Of greater interest are the cross-correlograms presented. These compare the correlations at
plus and minus four lags of band pass filtered consumption and GDP, investment and GDP, stock
accumulation and GDP, employment and GDP, and unemployment and GDP. Interestingly, given
the detailed modelling of firm level investment in the model, and the ability of the model to match
cross-sectional stylised facts, aggregate investment still performs poorly in comparison to the other
time series. This is in line with the failure of standard New Keynesian DSGE models to match
aggregate investment data satisfactorily.
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4.3 The CATS Model
Out of the papers studying the CATS model family, Gaffeo et al. (2008) provides the most in
depth empirical validation. This paper is particularly interesting, from our perspective, in that it
explicitly attempts to “rival the explanatory power of DSGE models” (ibid.: 443). As with Dosi
et al. (2008), the calibration is unexplained. However, instead of a list of stylised facts, the authors
regard endogenous business cycles as a basic explandum, and compare the model’s time series co-
movements with US data. Unfortunately the correlograms presented are mostly not comparable
with those of Dosi et al. (2008), describing the correlations at plus and minus four lags of Hodrick-
Prescott filtered employment and GDP, productivity and GDP, price index and GDP, interest rate
and GDP, and the real wage and GDP. Neither is there an attempt to compare these correlations
with a standard New Keynesian DSGE model - although on balance, it seems fair to say that the
model performs relatively poorly compared to Dosi et al. (2008).
4.4 The Eurace Model
Unsurprisingly, the Eurace model, given its size, is also not subject to formal estimation. Given
this, the Eurace model builders approach the calibration problem in the same manner as early
versions of the K&S and CATS models - a set of stylised facts is identified, and the region of the
parameter space that can reproduce those facts is identified. In general, as before, this seems to be
a relatively informal method, but Dawid et al. (2009) cite a number of varied empirical studies to
justify the choice of calibration. It is difficult, from the available literature, to judge the empirical
performance of the calibrated Eurace model.
4.5 Recent Models
There exist two prominent macro ACE models that attempt to combine the insights of the K&S
and CATS frameworks into simplified, more manageable models. The aim of Lengnick (2013), the
first of these, is to “take the most prominent ACE macro models and reduce them in complexity”
(pp.104). Again, the calibration is unexplained, but the model succeeds in generating artificial
Phillips curves, Beveridge curves, and the long run neutrality and short run non-neutrality of
money. The only cross-correlogram presented is between the price level and GDP, and the model
appears to perform as least as well as Gaffeo et al. (2008) along this dimension.
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The second attempt to combine the K&S and CATS frameworks is presented in Assenza et al.
(2015) - in this case, by including capital goods in a zero growth CATS framework. Again, the
calibration is relatively arbitrary, although a small number of the parameter choices are explained
(e.g. the desired level of capacity utilisation is chosen to match average capacity utilisation in
the USA). However, this paper presents by far the most in depth moment comparison exercise,
comparing autocorrelation functions and cross-correlograms of HP filtered GDP, consumption,
investment, and unemployment, against equivalent US time series, as well as absolute standard
deviations. The model performs strikingly well along these dimensions. Again, however, it is
interesting to note that investment still performs poorly, in a similar manner to DSGE models -
it is considerably more volatile than in the data. Interestingly, the model correlogram between
unemployment and total debt is qualitatively similar to that in US data, although there appears
to be a small phase shift, and the model correlations are lower at each lag than in the data.
Finally, the authors conclude with the observation that: “Bringing the model to the data will
be key to assess the effects of policy moves in a quantitative framework. The econometric practice
in agent based modelling is still in its infancy so that there is a long way to go before the model
is fully operative . . . however, the results obtained so far are promising and bode well for the
future.” This, more than anything, illustrates the apparent shift to viewing macroeconomic agent
based models as complete probability models in the sense of Haavelmo (1944), a view that does
not appear to be shared in earlier presentations of the CATS model.
4.6 GMM and Indirect Inference
Viewing agent based models as complete probability models allows a considerably greater arsenal
of econometric techniques to be employed in model validation, at least in principle. The obvious
possibilities are already regularly used in the DSGE literature - namely, the generalised method
of moments (analytical or simulated), indirect inference, and full information maximum likelihood
(with or without Bayesian priors). Interestingly, a version of the CATS model was estimated in
2007 using indirect inference, which is itself a special case of the generalised method of moments.
However, the moments used to estimate the model describe the firm size distribution in Italian
data - specifically, Pareto exponents estimated on those data. Given that the aggregate dynamics
of macroeconomic agent based models often appear to be driven by idiosyncratic shocks which are
not averaged out, given highly skewed size distributions, the distributions of firm size considered
in Bianchi et al. (2007) are of macroeconomic interest (also see Gabaix (2011) in this regard).
Nevertheless, these statistics are arguably of second-order importance if the basic explananda are
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still macroeconomic aggregates in the traditional sense. In principle, however, there is no reason
why indirect inference or simulated GMM cannot be used to estimate macroeconomic agent based
models against aggregate time series data.
Before we consider the use of limited information methods to estimate macroeconomic agent
based models, consider the theoretically ideal estimation procedure - maximum likelihood estima-
tion. The maximum likelihood estimator uses the following objective function:
Q(θ) =
1
t
T∑
t=1
lnL(xt|θ) (5)
Maximum likelihood chooses the parameter vector θ that maximise the log-likelihood of ob-
serving a sample x given the model in question. In practice, in a highly non-linear model, even
if we know the distribution of the exogenous shock processes, we will not be able to derive closed
form solutions for L and thus computing Q(θ) is a challenging task. This is compounded in agent
based models, where computing the relevant time series for one parameterisation alone can be
computationally costly. As a result, and as argued by Grazzini and Richiardi (2015), the only
feasible way forward with complex agent based models appears to be via some type of simulated
minimum distance estimation. In this case, (5) is approximated by the following objective function
(DeJong and Dave, 2007, pp. 154):
Γ(θ) = −g(X, θ)′Ωg(X, θ) (6)
Here, g(xt, θ) = 1/t
∑
f(xt, θ), where f(xt, θ) is a vector valued function relating the parameter
vector to the observed variables, summarising the “moment conditions” used in estimation. One
then wishes to minimise the norm of g(X, θ) - that is, choose θ to minimise the distance between
the model generated moments and the observed sample moments. The choice of weights Ω used in
(6) will then determine the norm used, and the optimal weights turn out to be those that minimise
the asymptotic variance of θˆ (see Hansen (1982) or DeJong and Dave (2007) for further discussion).
Equation (6) is therefore an approximation to (5), disregarding a certain amount of the available
sample information in return for computational feasibility. This type of estimation procedure, as
argued in Grazzini and Richiardi (2015), would appear to be the logical step forward for the
empirical validation of macroeconomic agent based models - particularly because a version of the
procedure appears to have been informally performed in the calibration exercises reviewed above.
Unfortunately, as indicated in Bianchi et al. (2007), agent based models are a priori no less likely
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to suffer from flat objective function problems than DSGE models - a difficult problem for any
extremum estimator approach, whether GMM, indirect inference, or maximum likelihood. In the
state of the art in structural macroeconometrics, this problem is usually solved by the incorporation
of prior assumptions and Bayesian techniques - but an application of this method to the K&S model
or CATS model is hard to imagine in the near future. Moreover, unlike in DSGE models, where the
order of integration and ergodicity are usually known a priori, it may not be immediately obvious
whether or not agent based models are stationary or ergodic. As defined in Grazzini and Richiardi
(2015), stationarity implies the existence of a statistical equilibrium, whilst ergodicity implies that,
regardless of initial conditions, the model will always settle at the same statistical equilibrium.
Whilst ergodicity in the strict sense is not necessary for the use of simulated minimum distance
estimation, stationarity is necessary.3 As well as the difficulty of applying Bayesian techniques to
ACE, therefore, one also faces the difficulty of establishing ergodicity and stationarity when this
is not known a priori.
Given the above, there appear to be two possibilities. The first is to apply simulated minimum
distance methods to macroeconomic agent based models as they stand, and deal with the associated
flat objective function problems pragmatically, taking into account the antecedent problems of
stationarity and ergodicity. The second is to incorporate some of the insights of agent based
modelling into more traditional macroeconomic models, such that stationarity and ergodicity can
be established a priori, and Bayesian techniques can be used.
4.7 Summary
Two major conclusions stand out from sections 3 and 4: first, that macro ACE models are very rich,
if rather varied, and second, that their complexity and analytical intractability make them very
difficult to validate empirically. Related to this is the absence of formal estimation procedures in
the vast majority of macroeconomics ACE papers. However, the available evidence - particularly
that presented in Assenza et al (2015), suggests that ACE is a fruitful modelling approach in
macroeconomics. Given the relative ease of estimating and validating DSGE models, and given
the significant amount of expertise in DSGE modelling and estimation in the profession as a whole,
this suggests that a fruitful way forward might be the incorporation of ACE insights into DSGE
modelling.
3Grazzini and Richiardi are concerned with weak stationarity; their definition of statistical equilibrium is then
a stationary aggregate outcome over a time window [T0, Tτ ] given initial conditions. Given this, stationarity is
a necessary condition for estimation by simulated minimum distance, as without this, the estimator will not be
consistent. Grazzini and Richiardi argue that ergodicity is not necessary, as given initial conditions the model can
still produce stationary output (ibid.: 154).
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5 Bridging the Gap
Section 2 of this paper isolated what we believe to be the three most important differences between
DSGE and ACE models. To recap, these are:
• The representative agent assumption versus heterogeneous interacting agents.
• Dynamics driven by exogenous shocks versus complexity and endogenous cycles.
• Rationality, in particular rational expectations, versus bounded rationality.
This section reviews studies within the DSGE framework that incorporate bounded rationality,
heterogeneous agents, and endogenous business cycles. In particular, we review those studies
that incorporate the Brock-Hommes complexity framework into DSGE models, and in so doing
respond to the three critiques of DSGE identified here. These models are known as behavioural
New Keynesian models. In the sense that these papers have features that characterize ACE, they
bridge the gap between the two modelling approaches. In section 5.1 we review the Brock and
Hommes complexity approach, and in section 5.2 the behavioural New Keynesian model. In section
5.3 we review Adam and Marcet’s approach to individual rationality, and explain how this can be
incorporated into the behavioural New Keynesian model to improve the microfoundations of the
latter. Section 5.4 discusses the theoretical and numerical properties of the individually rational
New Keynesian model, following Deak et al. (2015).
5.1 Brock-Hommes Complexity
The complexity framework comprehensively described in Hommes (2013), and first introduced in
Brock and Hommes (1997), provides a minimal way of generating complex dynamics via heteroge-
neous agents with varying degrees of rationality. As such it provides a simple method of answering
the major critiques of DSGE outlined above, but until recently was only explored in the context of
partial equilibrium models. A simple cob-web model demonstrates the main features. The model is
of a partial equilibrium with two types of producers. A proportion n1,t form rational expectations
of the price level pt at time t, denoted by Et(pt). This amounts to perfect foresight so Et(pt) = pt.
The remaining proportion of producers, 1−n1,t, are boundedly rational in a manner to be defined.
Their expectations, formed at time t− 1, are denoted by E∗t−1(pt). We assume linear demand and
supply curves subject to random shocks ǫd,t and ǫs,t respectively. Given n1,t and our definition of
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E
∗
t−1(·), the market-clearing price is given by:
D(pt) = a− dpt + ǫd,t (7)
S(pt,E
∗
t−1(pt), n1,t) = s(n1,tpt + (1− n1,t)E
∗
t−1(pt)) + ǫs,t (8)
D(pt) = S(pt,E
∗
t−1(pt), n1,t) (9)
where a, d and s are fixed parameters. These pin down the deterministic steady state of the price
level denoted by p. We assume that boundedly rational agents eventually forecast correctly, so
that in the steady state pt = E
∗
t−1(pt) = p which is given by p =
a
d+s .
The learning literature adopts two basic approaches to modelling boundedly rational expecta-
tions. The first is usually referred to as statistical learning, where agents are competent econome-
tricians who make observations of the price (in this example), have some idea of the data generating
process and estimate it using standard techniques. We leave a discussion of this approach to our
later application to a macroeconomic model below. Here we adopt the second approach, which as-
sumes that agents use simple heuristic forecasting rules. A general formulation that nests particular
examples found in the literature is an adaptive expectations rule of the form
E
∗
t−1(pt) = E
∗
t−2(pt−1) + λ(pt−1 − E
∗
t−2(pt−1) ; λ ∈ [0, 1] (10)
The key component of the Brock-Hommes framework giving rise to complex dynamics is the
method by which the proportions of rational and non-rational producers are updated over time.
Here the literature adopts a basic general framework set out in Young (2004). To limit the departure
from rationality, the approach of reinforcement learning proposes that, although adaptation can be
slow and there can be a random component of choice, the higher the ‘payoff’ (defined appropriately)
from taking an action in the past, the more likely it will be taken in the future. Here the payoff is
defined as last period’s squared forecasting error plus the costs of obtaining that forecasting rule.
Then the updated fractions of rational producers is given by a discrete logit model:
n1,t =
exp(−γ[(pt − Et(pt))
2 + C])
exp(−γ([pt − Et(pt))2 +C]) + exp(−γ([pt − E∗t−1(pt)]
2)
=
exp(−γC)
exp(−γC) + exp(−γ([pt − E∗t−1(pt)]
2)
(11)
The key features of (11) is that the best-performing rule will attract the most followers, and
that there is a fixed per period cost, C, of making rational predictions. The parameter γ is referred
to in the literature as the intensity of choice and dictates how quickly agents will switch to the best-
performing rule. The steady state proportion of rational producers is given by n1 =
exp(−γC)
exp(−γC)+1 .
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The stability properties of this model depend on the parameter values s, d, a, C that determine
the steady state and λ, γ that determine the speed of learning. For a high proportion of rational
producers the model exhibits local stability: in response to an exogenous shock price and output
return to their steady state values. As C increases above zero the proportion of rational producers
falls and we enter regions of local instability. However depending on λ, γ, the trajectories are locally
unstable, but do not explode. Rather they show chaotic patterns: random-like complex behaviour.
As forecast errors under adaptive expectations become large, non-rational but intelligent producers
switch behaviour by investing the amount C needed to make rational forecasts. Then forecast errors
fall and they switch back to non-rational forecasting.
5.2 The Behavioural New Keynesian Model
The Brock-Hommes framework has been used by a number of authors to propose a behavioural
version of the standard New Keynesian (NK) model (see e.g. Woodford (2003), Gali (2008)). These
include Branch and McGough (2010), Branch et al. (2012), Branch and Evans (2011), De Grauwe
and Katwasser (2012), De Grauwe (2011), De Grauwe (2012a), De Grauwe (2012b), Jang and Sacht
(2012), Massaro (2013) and Jang and Sacht (2014).
The basic three-equation linearized work-horse NK model used in this literature in its rational
expectations form is as follows:
yt = Etyt+1 − (rt − Etπt+1) + u1,t (12)
πt = βEt[πt+1] + λ(yt + u2,t) (13)
rt = ρrrt−1 + (1− ρr)(θpiπt + θyyt) + u3,t (14)
where yt, πt and rt are the output gap, the inflation rate and the nominal interest rate respectively.
The shock processes ui,t , i = 1, 3 should be interpreted as shocks to preferences, marginal costs and
monetary policy, respectively, and are usually AR(1) processes. (12) is the linearized Euler equation
for consumption which is equated with output in equilibrium (there is no government expenditure).
(13) is the NK Phillips curve and (14) is the nominal interest rate rule with persistence responding
to current inflation and the output gap. Expectations up to now are formed assuming rational
expectations and perfect information of the state vector (which includes the shock processes).4
As in the cob-web model example, the model becomes behavioural by a departure from RE
and the introduction of two groups of agents forming expectations through different learning rules.
4Habit in consumption and price indexing result in additional lags in yt in (12) and in pit in (13) providing
additional persistence mechanisms that help to fit the model to data.
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In De Grauwe (2012b) there are two groups using fundamentalist (f) and extrapolative (e) rules
with (possibly) non-RE market expectations denoted by E∗. The market forecasts are assumed to
be simple weighted averages:
E
∗
t yt+1 = αf,tE
∗
t y
f
t+1 + (1− αf,t)E
∗
t y
e
t+1 (15)
E
∗
tπt+1 = βf,tE
∗
tπ
f
t+1 + (1− βf,t)E
∗
tπ
e
t+1 (16)
We refer to this approach to non-rational expectations as the Euler Learning (EL) approach. The
model is completed by the expressions for the weights αf,t, βf,t, and the learning rules for the
output gap and inflation. The former follows the Brock-Hommes framework as follows:
αf,t =
exp(γUf,t({yt})
exp(γUf,t({yt})) + exp(γUe,t({yt}))
(17)
βf,t =
exp(γUf,t({πt}))
exp(γUf,t({π}t)) + exp(γUe,t({π}t))
(18)
where Uf,t({xt)}) is the payoff measure of the fundamentalist rule for outcome {xt} = {yt}, {πt},
given by a MSE predictor:
Uf,t({xt})) = ρUf,t−1({xt})) − (1− ρ)[xt−1 − Ef,t−2 xt−1]
2 (19)
Equations (12)-(14), with E replaced with E∗, and equations (15)-(19) completes the be-
havioural New Keynesian model without specifying the forecasting rules. Whilst De Grauwe,
for example, uses a selection of boundedly rational predictors, rules in the spirit of Brock and
Hommes (1997), Hommes (2013), and Branch and McGough (2010) are
E
∗
t y
f
t+1 = Ety
f
t+1 (20)
E
∗
t y
e
t+1 = E
∗
t−1y
e
t + λy(yt − E
∗
t−1y
e
t ) ; λy ∈ [0, 1] (21)
E
∗
tπ
f
t+1 = Etπ
f
t+1 (22)
E
∗
tπ
e
t+1 = E
∗
t−1π
e
t + λpi(πt − E
∗
t−1π
e
t ) ; λpi ∈ [0, 1] (23)
This assumes fundamentalists are rational and the extrapolative learners use a general adaptive
expectations rule. As before, we have:
αf,t =
exp(γ(Uf,t({yt})− C))
exp(γ(Uf,t({yt})− C)) + exp(γUe,t({yt}))
(24)
βf,t =
exp((γUf,t({πt})− C))
exp((γUf,t({π}t)− C)) + exp(γUe,t({π}t))
(25)
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where C represents the relative costs of being rational. Thus, by incorporating the Brock-Hommes
complexity framework into the workhorse New Keynesian DSGE model, the behavioural New
Keynesian model incorporates heterogeneity and bounded rationality into a DSGE framework. In
addition, and as with the simple Cobweb model presented in section 5.1, the behavioural NK model
can generate persistent and asymmetric fluctuations in response to small shocks, and generate
endogenous business cycles characterised by bounded instability and chaos (see e.g. Branch et al.
(2012)). Hence the behavioural NK model answers - at least to some extent - the three ACE
critiques of DSGE modelling outlined above.
5.3 Individual Rationality
As Graham (2011) has pointed out, the form of learning implied by the NK behavioural model above
follows the Euler equation approach and in effect assumes that agents forecast their own decisions -
for the household their consumption decision, and for the firm their price decision. In the statistical
learning approach pioneered in Evans and Honkapohja (2001), agents know the minimum state
variable (MSV) form of the equilibrium (equivalent to the saddle-path under rational expectations)
and use direct observations of these states to update their parameter estimates each period using
a discounted least-squares estimator. Then a statistical learning equilibrium is one where this
perceived law of motion and the actual law of motion coincide.
An alternative approach was first introduced by Eusepi and Preston (2011) into an RBC model.
This assumes that agents are individually rational (IR) given their beliefs over aggregate states and
prices. As with the Euler equation approach, agents cannot form model-consistent expectations
and instead learn about these variables using their knowledge of the MSV form of the equilibrium.
The two approaches then differ with respect to what agents learn about - their own decisions in
the first approach, and variables exogenous to the agents in the second approach.
The construction of an IR equilibrium for an NK model goes through the following steps.5:
• Solve the household budget constraint forward in time and impose the transversality condi-
tion.
• Use the first-order conditions and either linearize or assume point expectations to obtain
consumption as a function of expected nominal interest rates, inflation, wages and profits.
• For monopolistically competitive retail firms express the Calvo contract for the price opti-
mizing firm as a function of expected aggregate demand, aggregate inflation, real marginal
cost and mark-up shocks (again either linearizing or assuming point expectations).
5See Deak et al. (2015) for details.
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• Finally, choose the expectations formation mechanisms.
The result is an individually rational NK model. As above, in this instance we will use adaptive
expectations to illustrate the basic model. One-step ahead forecasts are then given by:
E
∗
txt+1 = E
∗
txt + λx(xt−j − E
∗
txt) ; j = 0, 1 (26)
Individually rational households make intertemporal decisions for their consumption demand and
hours supply given adaptive expectations of the wage rate, the nominal interest rate, inflation
and profits. Individually rational price-setting retail firms form adaptive expectations of aggregate
demand, aggregate inflation and real marginal costs. These macro-variables may be observed with
or without a one-period lag (j = 1, 0).
For example, for households the forecast of the future nominal interest is given by (26) with
x = rn so that
E
∗
t rn,t+1 = E
∗
t rn,t + λrn(rn,t−j − E
∗
t rn,t) =
∞∑
i=1
λirnrn,t−j−i ; j = 0, 1 (27)
Finally, the model is closed in the same way as the behavioural NK model considered above,
with two groups of households and firms, one adopting rational expectations and one individually
rational. The proportions of rational households and firms are given by
nh,t =
exp(γΦREh,t )
exp(γΦh,t)RE + exp(γΦ
IR
h,t)
nf,t =
exp(γΦREf,t )
exp(γΦREf,t ) + exp(γΦ
IR
f,t )
where fitness for households given by
ΦREh,t = µ
RE
h Φ
RE
h,t−1 −
(
weighted sum of forecast errors + Ch
)
ΦIRh,t = µ
IR
h Φ
IR
h,t−1 −
(
weighted sum of forecast errors
)
As before, Ch is a fixed cost of the rational expectations operator for households and firms.
5.4 The Individually Rational New Keynesian Model
The individually rational NK model described above incorporates heterogeneity and bounded ra-
tionality into DSGE modelling in the same manner as the behavioural NK models described in
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Figure 1: RE versus IR-RE Composite Expectations with nh = nf = 0.5, λx = 0.04; lagged
observations: Monetary Policy Shock
section 5.2, and may be considered an advance on this literature. The importance of the advance
lies in the more rigorous microfoundations of the individually rational model, where households are
boundedly rational over the exogenous variables of interest to them, rather than their own future
decisions.
As well as incorporating heterogeneity and bounded rationality, the individually rational NK
model also produces complex dynamics. This follows from the highly nonlinear nature of the
model, and results in a highly asymmetric joint distribution in the stochastic steady state. Table
1 describes the steady state distribution for a third order solution of the individually rational
NK model described in section 5.3 with the following parameterisation: µREh = µ
IR
h = µ
RE
f =
µIRf = 0.7, Ch = Cf = 0, σA = σMS = 0.01; σMPS = 0.001, where the last three parameters
are the standard deviations of the technology, mark-up, and monetary policy shocks, respectively.
Aggregate consumption, hours, inflation, and interest rates exhibit extremely high kurtosis, or fat
tails, and high skewness. Although the stochastic means of most endogenous variables are close
to their deterministic steady state values, the stochastic means of the proportions of rational and
boundedly rational agents are quite different from their deterministic steady state values.
Figure 1 provides more information about the model’s dynamic behaviour by plotting the
impulse response functions for the monetary policy shock with nh = nf = 0.5, λx = 0.04 and
standard values for the other parameters in (12)–(14).6 Despite the fundamental parameterisation
6See Deak et al. (2015)
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Deterministic Mean Stochastic Mean SD Skewness Kurtosis
Ct
C 1.0000 0.9912 0.0260 -2.037 15.56
Ht
H 1.0000 1.0036 0.0166 2.595 19.09
Wt
W 1.0000 0.9981 0.0204 0.560 1.951
Πt
Π 1.0000 1.0054 0.0169 1.644 9.904
Rn,t
Rn
1.0000 1.0054 0.0145 1.708 10.25
nh,t 0.5000 0.5795 0.1872 1.964 12.48
nf,t 0.5000 0.5195 0.0290 2.169 12.09
Table 1: Third Order Solution of NK IR-RE Model
being exactly the same for the RE model and the IR model, the latter produces highly persistent
and highly cyclical impulse response functions. Thus as well as a highly non-normal stochastic
steady state, the individually rational NK model also exhibits large responses to small shocks. In
this sense, the stable parameterisation here produces business cycles that are more endogenous
than those generated by rational expectations NK models. However, as with the behavioural NK
models examined in section 5.2, the individually rational NK model can also produce bounded
chaotic dynamics and therefore endogenous business cycles in the proper sense of the term.7
5.5 Summary
This section reviewed the behavioural New Keynesian model that incorporates Brock-Hommes
complexity into the conventional New Keynesian DSGE model. Existing behavioural NK models
use a form of Euler equation learning, which essentially means that households and firms forecast
their own future decisions. Thus an individually rational NK model was discussed, following recent
work by Deak et al. (2015), which can be considered an advance on this literature. Both the be-
havioural and individually rational NK models incorporate heterogeneity and bounded rationality
into the standard New Keynesian framework, and in so doing generate complex dynamics. There-
fore, this literature begins to answer the criticisms levelled at DSGE from the ACE community.
6 Concluding Remarks
This paper has considered the major points of contention between macro agent-based compu-
tational economics and dynamic stochastic general equilibrium modelling, and has reviewed a
literature which attempts to synthesise, and thus bridge the gap between, these two approaches.
7See the appendix for a full description of the individually rational New Keynesian model.
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First, we considered the major criticisms directed at DSGE modelling by the ACE community, and
then reviewed the main families of mature macro ACE models. We then reviewed the empirical
performance of these models. We then reviewed the literature surrounding the behavioural New
Keynesian model, and discussed the individually rational New Keynesian model following recent
work by Deak et al. (2015). This model improves the microfoundations of the behavioural NK
model, whilst answering the criticisms directed at DSGE modelling in the ACE literature.
We hope that the research program outlined in this review will constitute a profitable direction
for the economics profession following the perceived failure of DSGE modelling in the light of the
2008 financial crisis. Two avenues immediately suggest themselves. First, local interaction, in the
shape of matching functions or replicator dynamics, could be incorporated into the individually
rational NK model. A more challenging line of research would be to construct a similar model
using the heterogeneous agent methodology of Krusell and Smith (1998), which would bring the
methodology closer to the microsimulation structure of a lot of agent-based models.
The DSGE literature reviewed in the present paper is not, of course, the only way in which ACE
and DSGE models can be brought closer together. Sinitskaya and Tesfatsion (2015) work from the
opposite direction by introducing forward-looking optimizing agents into an ACE framework. They
use an equivalent to individual rationality which they refer to as “constructive rational decision
making”. This is a novel macro ACE model in having individually rational optimizers: households
maximize expected intertemporal utility over an infinite time-horizon and firms do the same with
their utility being taken as profit. But there are important differences of an ACE nature: the
time interval is divided into 6 sub-intervals, and agents adopt optimized parameterized decision
rules proportional to expected market-clearing prices and then update these parameters through
reinforcement learning. A third line of research, therefore, would be to explore the similarities
between the individually rational NK model presented here and the Sinitskaya and Tesfatsion
(2015) model, and potentially compare their empirical performance.
Finally, a limitation that affects any macroeconomics that seeks to incorporate bounded ra-
tionality is the gap in our empirical knowledge with respect to the microfoundations of economic
behaviour. For example, Lengnick (2013) argues that identity should be considered as part of
individual decisions, and concepts such as reciprocity, fairness, and loss aversion should be incor-
porated into macroeconomic models. Yet, he notes that simple behavioural rules in ACE models
are usually either derived from survey studies or “common-sensical reasoning”. A profitable way
forward here may be a sustained effort to incorporate the results of experimental economics into
macroeconomic analysis - extending work already done with robust maxmin decision rules (Hansen
and Sargent (2008)), smooth ambiguity utility (Ilut and Schneider (2014), Ju and Miao (2012)),
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prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky (1979), Kahneman et al. (1990), Barberis (2013) Dhami
and Al-Nowaihi (2010)), and hyperbolic discounting (Harris and Laibson (2001), Krusell and Smith
(2002)). This ambitious project is more in keeping with the inter-disciplinary nature of agent-based
modelling and awaits future research.
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A Appendix
A.1 The Rational Expectations Model
A.1.1 Households
Household j choose between work and leisure and therefore how much labour they supply. Let
Ct(j) be consumption and Ht(j) be the proportion of this available for work or leisure spent at
the former. The single-period utility is
Ut(j) = U(Ct(j),Ht(j)) = log(Ct(j)) − κ
Ht(j)
1+φ
1 + φ
(A.1)
In a stochastic environment, the value function of the representative household at time t is
given by
Vt(j) = Vt(Bt−1(j)) = Et
[
∞∑
s=0
βsU(Ct+s(j),Ht+s(j))
]
(A.2)
For the household’s problem at time t is to choose paths for consumption {Ct(j)}, labour sup-
ply {Ht(j)} and holdings of financial savings to maximize Vt(j) given by (A.2) given its budget
constraint in period t
Bt(j) = RtBt−1(j) +WtHt(j) + Γt − Ct(j) (A.3)
where Bt(j) is the given net stock of financial assets at the end of period t, Wt is the wage rate
and Rt is the ex post real interest rate paid on assets held at the beginning of period t given by
Rt =
Rn,t−1
Πt
(A.4)
where Rn,t and Πt are the nominal interest and inflation rates respectively and Γt are profits from
wholesale and retail firms owned by households. Wt, Rt and Γt are all exogenous to household j.
As usual all variables are expressed in real terms relative to the price of final output.
The first order conditions are
UC,t(j) = βEt [Rt+1UC,t+1(j)] (A.5)
UL,t(j)
UC,t(j)
= Wt (A.6)
An equivalent representation of the Euler consumption equation (A.5) is
1 = Et [Λt,t+1(j)Rt+1] (A.7)
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where Λt,t+1(j) ≡ β
UC,t+1(j)
UC,t(j)
is the real stochastic discount factor for household j, over the interval
[t, t+ 1].
For our choice of utility function UC,t =
1
Ct
and UH,t = −κH
φ
t so these become
1
Ct(j)
= βEt
[
Rt+1
Ct+1(j)
]
(A.8)
κCt(j)Ht(j)
φ = Wt ⇒ Ht =
(
Wt
κCt(j)
) 1
φ
(A.9)
In a symmetric equilibrium of identical households Ct(j) = Ct, aggregate per household con-
sumption and Ht(j) = Ht, average hours worked,
A.1.2 Firms in the Wholesale
Wholesale firms employ a Cobb-Douglas production function to produce a homogeneous output
Y Wt = F (At,Ht) = AtH
α
t (A.10)
where At is total factor productivity. Profit-maximizing demand for labour results in the first
order condition
Wt =
PWt
Pt
FH,t = α
PWt
Pt
Y Wt
Ht
(A.11)
Hence from (A.9) and (A.11) we have
Ht =

αPWtPt
κ


1
1+φ
(A.12)
A.1.3 Firms in the Retail Sector
The retail sector uses a homogeneous wholesale good to produce a basket of differentiated goods
for aggregate consumption
Ct =
(∫ 1
0
Ct(m)
(ζ−1)/ζdm
)ζ/(ζ−1)
(A.13)
where ζ is the elasticity of substitution. For each m, the consumer chooses Ct(m) at a price Pt(m)
to maximize (A.13) given total expenditure
∫ 1
0 Pt(m)Ct(m)dm. This results in a set of consumption
demand equations for each differentiated good m with price Pt(m) of the form
Ct(m) =
(
Pt(m)
Pt
)
−ζ
Ct ⇒ Yt(m) =
(
Pt(m)
Pt
)
−ζ
Yt (A.14)
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where Pt =
[∫ 1
0 Pt(m)
1−ζdm
] 1
1−ζ
. Pt is the aggregate price index. Ct and Pt are Dixit-Stigliz
aggregates – see Dixit and Stiglitz (1977).
For each variety m the retail good is produced from wholesale production according to an
iceberg technology
Yt(m) = Y
W
t = AtHt(m)
α (A.15)
Following Calvo (1983), we now assume that there is a probability of 1− ξ at each period that
the price of each retail good m is set optimally to P 0t (m). If the price is not re-optimized, then
it is held fixed.8 For each retail producer m, given its real marginal cost MCt, the objective is at
time t to choose {P 0t (m)} to maximize discounted profits
Et
∞∑
k=0
ξkΛt,t+kYt+k(m)
[
P 0t (m)− Pt+kMCt+k
]
(A.16)
subject to (A.14), where Λt,t+k ≡ β
k UC,t+k/Pt+k
UC,t/Pt
is now the nominal stochastic discount factor over
the interval [t, t+ k]. The solution to this is
Et
∞∑
k=0
ξkΛt,t+kYt+k(m)
[
P 0t (m)−
1
(1− 1/ζ)
Pt+kMCt+k
]
= 0 (A.17)
and by the law of large numbers the evolution of the price index is given by
P 1−ζt+1 = ξP
1−ζ
t + (1− ξ)(P
0
t+1)
1−ζ (A.18)
In order to set up the model in non-linear form as a set of difference equations, required for
software packages such a Dynare, we need to represent the price dynamics as difference equations.
First define k periods ahead inflation as
Πt,t+k ≡
Pt+k
Pt
=
Pt+1
Pt
Pt+2
Pt+1
· ·
Pt+k−1
Pt+k
= Πt+1Πt+2 · ·Πt+k
Note that Πt,t+1 = Πt+1 and Πt,t = 1.
Next using (A.14) with Pt+k(m) = P0(m), the price set at time t which survives with probability
ξ, we have that
Λt,t+kYt+k(m) = β
kUC,t+k
UC,t
Pt
Pt+k
(
P0(m)
Pt+k
)
−ζ
Yt+k = β
kUC,t+k
UC,t
Πζ−1t,t+k
(
P0(m)
Pt
)
−ζ
Yt+k
8Thus we can interpret 1
1−ξ
as the average duration for which prices are left unchanged.
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Hence cancelling out
(
P0(m)
Pt
)
−ζ
and multiplying by
UC,t
Pt
we can write (A.17) as
Et
∞∑
k=0
(ξβ)kUC,t+kΠ
ζ−1
t,t+kYt+k
[
P 0t (m)
Pt
−Πt+kMCt+kMSt+k
]
= 0 (A.19)
We seek a symmetric equilibrium where firms who are either re-setting their prices or are locked
into a contract are identical. In such an equilibrium, the price dynamics can be written as difference
equations as follows (see Appendix A):
P 0t
Pt
=
Jt
JJt
(A.20)
JJt − ξEt
[
Πζ−1t+1JJt+1Λt,t+1
]
= Yt (A.21)
Jt − ξEt
[
Πζt+1Jt+1Λt,t+1
]
=
(
1
1− 1ζ
)
YtMCtMSt (A.22)
1 = ξΠζ−1t + (1− ξ)
(
Jt
JJt
)1−ζ
(A.23)
∆t = ξΠ
ζ
α
t ∆t−1 + (1− ξ)
(
Jt
JJt
) ζ
α
(A.24)
(A.25)
MCt =
PWt
Pt
=
Wt
FH,t
(A.26)
where (A.41) uses (A.11). We have introduced a mark-up shockMSt. Notice that the real marginal
cost, MCt, is no longer fixed as it in the flexi-price case model.
Price dispersion lowers aggregate output as follows. Market clearing in the labour market gives
Ht =
n∑
m=1
Ht(m) =
n∑
m=1
(
Yt(m)
At
) 1
α
=
(
Yt
At
) 1
α
n∑
m=1
(
Pt(m)
Pt
)
−
ζ
α
(A.27)
using (A.14).
Hence equilibrium for good m gives
Yt =
Y Wt
∆αt
(A.28)
where price dispersion is defined by
∆t ≡
(
n∑
m=1
(
Pt(m)
Pt
)
−
ζ
α
)
(A.29)
Price dispersion is linked to inflation as follows. Assuming as before that the number of firms
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is large we obtain the following dynamic relationship:
∆t = ξΠ
ζ
α
t ∆t−1 + (1− ξ)
(
Jt
JJt
)
−
ζ
α
(A.30)
Proof
See Appendix B.
A.1.4 Profits
To close the model with internal rationality we require total profits from retail and wholesale firms.
Γt, remitted to households. This is given in real terms by
Γt = Yt −
PWt
Pt
Y Wt︸ ︷︷ ︸
retail
+
PWt
Pt
Y Wt −WtHt︸ ︷︷ ︸
Wholesale
= Yt − α
PWt
Pt
Y Wt (A.31)
using the first-order condition (A.11).
A.1.5 Flexi-Price Output
In order to evaluate the output gap we need the flexi-price limit as ξ → 0 (but retaining monop-
olistic competition with c > 0 and ζ < ∞ and the mark-up shock MSt). As for the sticky-price
model labour supply and demand conditions are
Wt = CtκH
φ
t = YtκH
φ
t = AtκH
α+φ
t (A.32)
Wt =
PMt
Pt
αY Wt
Ht
= αMCtAtH
α−1
t (A.33)
Hence Ht =
(
αMCt
κ
) 1
1+φ
(A.34)
As ξ ⇒ 0 we have
P 0t
Pt
= 1 =
MCtMSt
1− 1ζ
(A.35)
It follow that
HFt =

α
(
1− 1ζ
)
MStκ


1
1+φ
=
(
α
κMSt
) 1
1+φ
(A.36)
Y Ft = At(H
F
t )
α (A.37)
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A.1.6 Closing the Model
The model is closed with a resource constraint
Yt = Ct +Gt (A.38)
where Gt is an exogenous demand process and a monetary policy rule for the nominal interest rate
is given by the following Taylor-type rule
log
(
Rn,t
Rn
)
= ρr log
(
Rn,t−1
Rn
)
+ (1− ρr)
(
θθ log
(
Πt
Π
)
+ θy log
(
Yt
Y
))
+ ǫMPS,t, (A.39)
or
log
(
Rn,t
Rn
)
= ρr log
(
Rn,t−1
Rn
)
+ (1− ρr)θpi log
(
Πt
Π
)
+ (1− ρr)θy log
(
Yt
Y Ft
)
+ ǫMPS,t, (A.40)
where Y Ft is the flexi-price level of output and ǫMPS,t is a monetary policy i.i.d shock
9 and finally
there are two exogenous AR1 shock processes to technology and marginal cost (the latter being
interpreted as a mark-up shock):
logAt − logA = ρA(logAt−1 − logA) + ǫA,t
logGt − logG = ρG(logGt−1 − logG) + ǫG,t
logMSt − logMS = ρMS(logMSt−1 − logMS) + ǫMS,t
and ǫM,t is an i.i.d. shock to monetary policy.
A.1.7 Summary of Model
Households:
Ut = U(Ct,Ht) = logCt − κ
H1+φt
1 + φ
UC,t = βEt [Rt+1UC,t+1]
or Et[Λt,t+1Rt+1] = 1 where Λt−1,t =
βUC,t
UC,t−1
Rt =
Rn,t−1
Πt
UC,t =
1
Ct
UH,t = −κH
φ
t
9(A.41) is an ‘implementable’ form of the Taylor rule which stabilizes output about its steady state.
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UL,t
UC,t
= Wt
Firms:
Y Wt = F (At,Ht) = AtH
α
t
Yt =
Y Wt
∆αt
PWt
Pt
FH,t =
PWt
Pt
αY Wt
Ht
=Wt
P 0t
Pt
=
Jt
JJt
JJt = ξEt
[
Πζ−1t+1JJt+1Λt,t+1
]
+ Yt
Jt = ξEt
[
Πζt+1Jt+1Λt,t+1
]
+
(
1
1− 1ζ
)
YtMCtMSt
1 = ξΠζ−1t + (1− ξ)
(
Jt
JJt
)1−ζ
∆t = ξΠ
ζ
α
t ∆t−1 + (1− ξ)
(
Jt
JJt
)
−
ζ
α
MCt =
PWt
Pt
=
Wt
FH,t
Γt = Yt − αMCtY
W
t
Closure:
Yt = Ct +Gt
log
(
Rn,t
Rn
)
= ρr log
(
Rn,t−1
Rn
)
+ (1− ρr)
(
θθ log
(
Πt
Π
)
+ θy log
(
Yt
Y
))
+ ǫM,t
or log
(
Rn,t
Rn
)
= ρr log
(
Rn,t−1
Rn
)
+ (1− ρr)θpi log
(
Πt
Π
)
+ (1− ρr)θy log
(
Yt
Y Ft
)
+ ǫM,t
logAt − logA = ρA(logAt−1 − logA) + ǫA,t
logGt − logG = ρG(logGt−1 − logG) + ǫG,t
logMSt − logMS = ρMS(logMSt−1 − logMS) + ǫMS,t
A.2 Exogenous Point Expectations
As a first step towards individual rationality we now formulate the consumption and pricing decision
of the household and firms respectively in terms of current and expected future aggregate variables
exogenous these agents.
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A.2.1 Households
For households, solving (A.3) forward in time and imposing the transversality condition on debt
we can write
Bt−1(j) = PVt(Ct(j)) − PVt(WtHt(j)) − PVt(Γt) (A.41)
where the present (expected) value of a series {Xt+i}
∞
i=0 at time t is defined by
PVt(Xt) ≡ Et
∞∑
i=0
Xt+i
Rt,t+i
=
Xt
Rt
+
1
Rt
PVt+1(Xt+1) (A.42)
where Rt,t+1 ≡ RtRt+1Rt+2 · · · Rt+i is the real interest rate over the interval [t, t+ i].
The forward-looking budget constraint (A.41) holds for the representative household. In ag-
gregate there is no net debt so Bt−1 = 0. Then in a symmetric equilibrium, substituting for Ht
from (A.9) we have
PVt(Ct) =
1
κ
1
φ
PVt

W 1+ 1φt
C
1
φ
t

+ PVt(Γt) (A.43)
Solving (A.8) forward in time we have for i ≥ 1
1
Ct
= βiEt
[
Rt+1,t+i
Ct+i
]
; i ≥ 1 (A.44)
The individually rational solution to the household optimization problem seeks a solution to its
decision functions for Ct and Ht that are functions of non-rational point expectations {E
∗
tWt+i}
∞
i=1,
{E∗tRt+1,t+i}
∞
i=1 and {E
∗
tΓt+i}
∞
i=0 treated as exogenous processes given at time t as opposed to
rational model-consistent expectations {EtWt+i}
∞
i=1 etc.
10 With point expectations we use (A.44)
to obtain
E
∗
tCt+i = Ctβ
i
E
∗
tRt+1,t+i ; i ≥ 1 (A.45)
E
∗
t (Wt+iHt+i) =
1
κ
1
φ
(E∗tWt+i)
1+ 1
φ
(E∗tCt+i)
1
φ
(A.46)
Substituting (A.45) and (A.46) into the forward-looking household budget constraint and using∑
∞
i=0 β
i = 11−β , we arrive at
Ct
Rt(1− β)
=
1
Rt(κCt)
1
φ
(
W
1+ 1
φ
t +
∞∑
i=1
(β
1
φ )−i
(
E
∗
tWt+i
E∗tRt+1,t+i
)1+ 1
φ
)
+
∞∑
i=0
E
∗
tΓt+i
E∗tRt,t+i
10With point expectations agents treat E∗t (·) as certain, although the environment is stochastic (see Evans and
Honkapohja (2001), page 61). Since Etf(Xt) ≈ f(Et(Xt)) and Etf(XtYt)) ≈ f(Et(XtYt)) up to a first-order Taylor-
series expansion, assuming point expectations is equivalent to using a linear approximation of (A.43) and (A.44) as
is usually done in the literature.
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(A.47)
Ht =
(
Wt
κCt
) 1
φ
(A.48)
Writing E∗tRt,t+i = RtE
∗
tRt+1,t+i for i ≥ 1 (A.47) becomes
Ct
(1− β)
=
1
(κCt)
1
φ
(
W
1+ 1
φ
t +
∞∑
i=1
(β
1
φ )−i
(
E
∗
tWt+i
E∗tRt+1,t+i
)1+ 1
φ
)
+ Γt +
∞∑
i=1
E
∗
tΓt+i
E∗tRt+1,t+i
(A.49)
This can be written as
Ct
(1− β)
=
1
(κCt)
1
φ
(
W
1+ 1
φ
t +Ω1,t
)
+ Γt +Ω2,t (A.50)
Ω1,t ≡
∞∑
i=1
(β
1
φ )−i
(
E
∗
tWt+i
E∗tRt+1,t+i
)1+ 1
φ
= (β
1
φ )−1
(
E
∗
tWt+1
E∗tRt+1,t+1
)1+ 1
φ
+ (β
1
φ )−1Ω1,t+1
Ω2,t ≡
∞∑
i=1
E
∗
tΓt+i
E
∗
tRt+1,t+i
=
E
∗
tΓt+1
E
∗
tRt+1,t+1
+Ω2,t+1
With a non-zero balanced growth steady state β is simply replaced with βg in the expressions for
Ct and Ω1,t above.
(A.48) and (A.50) and constitute the consumption and hours decision rules given point expec-
tations of {E∗tWt+i}
∞
i=1, {E
∗
tRt+1,t+i}
∞
i=1 and {E
∗
tΓt+i}
∞
i=0.
A.2.2 Retail Firms
Turning next to price-setting by retail firms, write (A.21) and (A.22) as
Jt =
(
1
1− 1ζ
)
YtMCtMSt + Et
∞∑
k=1
ξkΛt,t+kΠ
ζ
t,t+kYt+kMCt+kMSt+k (A.51)
JJt = Yt + Et
∞∑
k=1
ξkΛt,t+kΠ
ζ−1
t,t+kYt+k (A.52)
Then assuming point expectations (as for households)
Jt =
(
1
1− 1ζ
)(
YtMCtMSt +
∞∑
k=1
ξkE∗tΛt,t+k(E
∗
tΠt,t+k)
ζ
E
∗
tYt+kE
∗
tMCt+kE
∗
tMSt+k
)
=
(
1
1− 1ζ
)
(YtMCtMSt +Ω3,t) (A.53)
JJt = Yt +
∞∑
k=1
ξkE∗tΛt,t+k(E
∗
tΠt,t+k)
ζ−1
E
∗
tYt+k
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= Yt +Ω4,t (A.54)
where noting that E∗tΛt,t+1 =
1
E
∗
tRt+1
and Πt,t+1 = Πt+1 we have
Ω3,t = ξ
(E∗tΠt+1)
ζ
E
∗
tYt+1E
∗
tMCt+1E
∗
tMSt+1
E∗tRt+1
+ ξ
E
∗
tΠ
ζ
t+1
E∗tRt+1
Ω3,t+1
(A.55)
Ω4,t = ξ(
E
∗
tΠt+1)
ζ−1
E
∗
tYt+1
E∗tRt+1
+ ξ
E
∗
tΠ
ζ−1
t+1
E∗tRt+1
Ω4,t+1 (A.56)
Recalling that the optimal price re-setting decision rule is given by
POt
Pt
= JtJJt , (A.53) and (A.54)
now give us the this rule given exogenous expectations of {E∗tΠt+i}
∞
i=0, {E
∗
tRt,t+i}
∞
i=0, {E
∗
tYt+i}
∞
i=0,
{E∗tMCt+i}
∞
i=0 and {E
∗
tMSt+i}
∞
i=0
Recalling that the optimal price re-setting decision rule is given by
POt
Pt
= JtJJt , (A.53) and (A.54)
now give us the this rule given exogenous expectations of {E∗tΠt+i}
∞
i=0, {E
∗
tRt,t+i}
∞
i=0, {E
∗
tYt+i}
∞
i=0,
{E∗tMCt+i}
∞
i=0 and {E
∗
tMSt+i}
∞
i=0
A.3 Individual Rationality in the NK Model
The final step to complete the IR equilibrium is to choose the learning rule for {E∗tWt+i}
∞
i=0,
{E∗tRt,t+i}
∞
i=0 and {E
∗
tΓt+i}
∞
i=0 for households and {E
∗
tΠt+i}
∞
i=0, {E
∗
tRt,t+i}
∞
i=0, {E
∗
tYt+i}
∞
i=0, {E
∗
tMCt+i}
∞
i=0
and {E∗tMSt+i}
∞
i=0 for retail firms.
We assume general adaptive expectations rules so that
E
∗
t [Wt+i] = E
∗
t [Wt+1] for i ≥ 1 (A.57)
and similarly for {E∗tΓt+i}
∞
i=0, {E
∗
tΠt+i}
∞
i=0, {E
∗
tYt+i}
∞
i=0, {E
∗
tMCt+i}
∞
i=0 and {E
∗
tMSt+i}
∞
i=0 whilst
with point expectations
E
∗
tRt+1,t+i = E
∗
t
[
Rn,t
Πt+1
Rn,t+1
Πt+2
· · ·
Rn,t+i−1
Πt+i
]
=
Rn,t
E
∗
tRn,t+1
(
E
∗
tRn,t+1
E
∗
tΠt+1
)i
for i ≥ 1 (A.58)
which takes into account the observation of Rn,t at time t.
One-period ahead forecasts are given by
E
∗
t [Wt+1] = E
∗
t−1[Wt] + λW
(
Wt − E
∗
t−1[Wt]
)
; λW ∈ [0, 1]
E
∗
t [Γt+1] = E
∗
t−1[Γt] + λΓ
(
Γt − E
∗
t−1[Γt]
)
; λΓ ∈ [0, 1]
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E
∗
t [Rn,t+1] = E
∗
t−1[Rn,t] + λRn
(
Rn,t − E
∗
t−1[Rn,t]
)
; (households)
E
∗
h,t[Πt+1] = E
∗
t−1[Πt] + λh,Π
(
Πt − E
∗
t−1[Πt]
)
; λh,Π ∈ [0, 1] (households)
E
∗
f,t[Πt+1] = E
∗
t−1[Πt] + λf,Π
(
Πt − E
∗
t−1[Πt]
)
; λf,Π ∈ [0, 1] (firms)
E
∗
t [Yt+1] = E
∗
t−1[Yt] + λY
(
Yt − E
∗
t−1[Yt]
)
; λY ∈ [0, 1]
E
∗
t [M˜Ct+1] = E
∗
t−1[M˜Ct] + λMC
(
M˜Ct − E
∗
t−1[M˜Ct]
)
; λMC ∈ [0, 1]
where M˜Ct ≡ MCtMSt
noting that we assume that M˜Ct is observed by the firm, but it cannot disentangle MCt andMSt.
With adaptive point expectations (A.49) now becomes
Ct
(1− β)
=
1
(κCt)
1
φ

W 1+ 1φt +
((
E
∗
tRn,t+1
Rn,t
)
E
∗
tWt+1
)1+ 1
φ
β
1
φ (E∗tR
ex
t+1)
1+ 1
φ − 1

+ Γt +
(
E
∗
tRn,t+1
Rn,t
)
E
∗
tΓt+1
E∗tR
ex
t+1 − 1
where we have defined the ex post real interest rate as
Rext ≡
Rn,t
Πt
(A.59)
whilst (A.55) and (A.56) now become
Ω3,t =
ξ(E∗tΠt+1)
ζ
E
∗
tYt+1E
∗
tMCt+1E
∗
tMSt+1
E
∗
tRt+1 − ξ(Πt+1)
ζ
Ω4,t =
ξ(E∗tΠt+1)
ζ−1
E
∗
tYt+1
E
∗
tRt+1 − ξ(E
∗
tΠt+1)
ζ−1
This completes the individually equilibrium with point adaptive expectations.
A.4 Heterogeneous Expectations
The behavioural model consists of a proportions nh,t and nf,t of rational households and firms
respectively. Denote the outcome of for the IR agents of Xt by X
IR
t given above and the cor-
responding outcome for RE agents who adopt composite-model consistent expectations by XREt .
Then aggregate consumption labour supply and wholesale output are given by
Ct = nh,tC
RE
t + (1− nh,t)C
IR
t (A.60)
Ht = nh,tH
RE
t + (1− nh,t)H
IR
t (A.61)
Y W = AtH
α
t (A.62)
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For retail firms the aggregate re-optimized price is given by
POt
Pt
= nf,t
(
POt
Pt
)RE
+ (1− nf,t)
(
POt
Pt
)IR
(A.63)
with aggregate and dispersion given by
1 = ξΠζ−1t + (1− ξ)
(
Jt
JJt
)1−ζ
(A.64)
∆t = ξΠ
ζ
α
t ∆t−1 + (1− ξ)
(
Jt
JJt
)
−
ζ
α
(A.65)
Then the proportions of rational households and firms is given by
nh,t =
exp(γΦREh,t )
exp(γΦh,t)RE + exp(γΦ
IR
h,t)
(A.66)
nf,t =
exp(γΦREf,t )
exp(γΦREf,t ) + exp(γΦ
IR
f,t )
(A.67)
where payoffs ΦREh,t , Φ
RE
h,t and Φ
IR
h,t, Φ
IR
h,t are expressed on terms of a discounted sum of past weighted
forecast errors, Φh,t say, starting at t = 0 for with rational and non-rational households respectively:
ΦREh,t = µ
RE
h Φ
RE
h,t−1 −
(
wW ((Wt − Eh,t−1Wt)/W )
2 +wh,Π((Πt −Eh,t−1Π)/Π)
2
+ wΓ((Γt − Eh,t−1Γt)/Γ)
2 + wR((Rn,t − Et−1Rn,t)/Rn)
2 + Ch
)
ΦIRh,t = µ
IR
h Φ
IR
h,t−1 −
(
wW ((Wt − E
∗
h,t−1Wt)/W )
2 + wh,Π((Πt − E
∗
h,t−1Π)/Π)
2
+ wΓ((Γt − E
∗
h,t−1Γt)/Γ)
2 + wR((Rn,t − Et−1Rn,t)/Rn)
2
)
The parameter Ch is a fixed cost of being rational for households. For firms this becomes
ΦREf,t = µ
RE
f Φ
RE
f,t−1 −
(
wY ((Yt − Ef,t−1Yt)/Y )
2 + wf,Π((Πt − Ef,t−1Π)/Π)
2
+ wMC((M˜Ct − Ef,t−1M˜Ct)/MC)
2 + Cf
)
ΦIRf,t = µ
IR
f Φ
IR
f,t−1 −
(
wY ((Yt − E
∗
f,t−1Yt)/Y )
2 + wf,Π((Πt − E
∗
f,t−1Π)/Π)
2
+ wMC((M˜Ct − E
∗
f,t−1M˜Ct)/MC)
2
)
where the parameter Cf is a fixed cost of being rational for firms and we allow for the possibility
that Ch 6= Cf .
Thus the proportion of rational agents in the steady state is given by
nh =
exp(−γCh)
exp(−γCh) + 1
(A.68)
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nf =
exp(−γCf )
exp(−γCf ) + 1
(A.69)
which is pinned down by the cost parameters (Ch, Cf ) (which can be positive or negative).
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